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Peck: The Failure of Federal Biotechnology Regulation

THE FAILURE OF FEDERAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
REGULATION
Alison Peck
ABSTRACT
The recent court case and state ballot measures regarding
mandatory labels for Genetically Modified Organisms
(“GMOs”) suggest the need for a deeper conversation about the
federal framework for regulating biotechnology. What is it
about GMOs that consumers feel they have the “right to
know?” Why has a generation of federal biotechnology
regulation failed to satisfy consumer concerns? Are those
concerns irrational, or is the regulatory structure inadequate?
This Article argues that many consumer concerns underlying
the labeling movement raise important scientific and extrascientific questions that have been apparent since the advent of
the technology in the 1980s. Moreover, these concerns persist
because the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of
Biotechnology has failed to respond to them effectively. The
Coordinated Framework was based on statutes that pre-existed
the technology and thus poorly fit the unique risks of genetic
engineering. Today, genetic engineering is on the verge of a
radical shift in technology, a shift that has already begun to
burst the seams of those old statutes, leaving agencies with no
regulatory authority at all over new products. This Article
reviews the evidence behind persistent concerns about GMOs,
considers the failures of the Coordinated Framework to address
the most valid of those concerns, and canvasses policy questions
that Congress must consider to more effectively tailor agency
authority to address the risks and to enhance the potential of
this rapidly-changing field of technology.
I. INTRODUCTION
It has become fashionable for the media to write off consumer
concerns about GMOs as “science denial,” akin to denying scientific
evidence of climate change or evolution.1 Nevertheless, those concerns
Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. This work was prepared
with the support of the West Virginia University College of Law and the Arthur B. Hodges
Summer Research Grant. The author also wishes to thank the 2016 World Champion
Chicago Cubs without whom this Article would have been finished a lot sooner.
1
See, e.g., Fred Hiatt, Science That is Hard to Swallow, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fred-hiatt-genetically-modified-foods-
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persist. Moreover, the controversy over labeling of genetically-engineered
foods suggests the need for a deeper conversation about the federal
framework for regulating biotechnology. 2 Why do consumers feel they
have the “right to know” if a food is genetically modified, and what,
exactly, do they want to know about those foods? Why has a generation
of federal biotechnology regulation failed to satisfy these consumer
concerns? Are these concerns simply irrational, or does their persistence
suggest that federal regulation has missed the mark?
Instead of setting up a straw man by asking the simplistic question,
“Are GMOs safe?,” what is needed is a careful consideration of the most
legitimate concerns raised about genetically-engineered products and a
carefully nuanced approach to regulation that addresses those legitimate
concerns. As United Kingdom journalist Mark Henderson stated: “The
whole question of being pro- or anti-GMO is in many ways a bad one. The
better question is what crop, with what modification, for what purpose,
made by whom?”3 This Article seeks to take consumer concerns seriously,
to identify the most legitimate public concerns, and to explain why the
current federal regulatory framework fails to adequately respond to those
prove-hard-for-americans-to-stomach/2015/02/08/3ae7902c-ad60-11e4-9c91e9d2f9fde644_story.html?utm_term=.6e20e47ce351 [https://perma.cc/JXB8-P2ZP]; see also
Joel Achenbach, Why Do Many Reasonable People Doubt Science?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar.
2015),
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2015/03/science-doubters/achenbach-text
[https://perma.cc/VG7S-Z8NM]; William Saletan, Unhealthy Fixation: The War against
Genetically Modified Organisms is Full of Fearmongering, Errors, and Frauds. Labeling Them Will
Not Make You Safer, SLATE (July 15, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_
science/science/2015/07/are_gmos_safe_yes_the_case_against_them_is_full_of_fraud_lies
_and_errors.html [https://perma.cc/6BH8-3MGQ].
2
In recent years, several states passed laws requiring that genetically-engineered (“GE”)
foods be labeled. See, e.g., 2013 CONN. PUB. ACTS 9–10 (13-183); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22
§ 2591 (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 3043 (2016); see also Ross H. Pifer, Mandatory Labeling
Laws: What Do Recent State Enactments Portend for the Future of GMOs?, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV.
789, 790 (2014). In 2015, a federal district court upheld the Vermont law against claims that
it impermissibly mandated speech and restricted interstate commerce. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n
v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 615 (D. Vt. 2015). Before the Vermont law could become
operative, Congress passed legislation requiring the Department of Agriculture to develop
a federal “disclosure standard” for genetically-engineered foods. National Bioengineered
Food Disclosure Standard, Pub. L. 114-126, 130 Stat. 834 (July 29, 2016). The compromise
legislation satisfied neither food manufacturers nor consumer’s groups. Dan Charles,
Congress Just Passed a GMO Labeling Bill. Nobody’s Super Happy about It., ALL THINGS
CONSIDERED (July 14, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/07/14/
486060866/congress-just-passed-a-gmo-labeling-bill-nobodys-super-happy-about-it
[https://perma.cc/M25R-LQJF].
3
See The Geek Manifesto on GM Crops, GEEK MANIFESTO (May 24, 2012),
https://geekmanifesto.wordpress.com/2012/05/24/the-geek-manifesto-on-gm-crops/
[https://perma.cc/AJY3-5C45] (expressing the need for more poignant questions about how
genetically-modified (“GM”) crops are being utilized); see generally MARK HENDERSON, THE
GEEK MANIFESTO 231–35 (2012) (discussing a variety of issues related to GM crops).
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concerns. This diagnosis of the real problem with GMOs is intended to
pave the way toward modifications of the current regulatory structure
that respond rationally to the persistent concerns of the majority of U.S.
consumers.
This Article concludes that, as research on human health impacts
develop, consumer concerns raise legitimate questions about proven agroenvironmental impacts, socio-economic harms, and the appropriate level
of precaution. These questions remain reasonable even if, as GMO
supporters assert, most genetically-engineered foods are safe for human
consumption most of the time. These reasonable consumer concerns have
persisted, in large part, because they were ignored by the Coordinated
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, released by the Reagan
Administration’s Office of Science and Technology Policy in 1986 as the
first attempt to coordinate federal oversight of the emerging technology. 4
The cracks in that foundation have begun to grow as some products now
evade regulation under that framework. 5 As long as federal regulators
continue to ignore these cracks and fissures, public dissatisfaction with
GMO regulation will continue. Moreover, as genetic engineering
continues to evolve and is set for a transformative breakthrough with the
use of new technologies, biotechnology is set to outgrow the Coordinated
Framework entirely, and discussion of a new regulatory structure is
urgently needed.6
Part II of this Article identifies actual and legitimate consumer
concerns about genetic engineering and concerns that arise from scientific,
as well as economic, social, and legal factors.7 Part III turns to the failures
of the existing regulatory regime based on the Coordinated Framework,
as well as risks that the Coordinated Framework does not purport to
reach, such as trade losses and unique liability concerns relating to

See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June
26, 1986).
5
See infra Part III.
6
See Memorandum from John P. Holdren, Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology, to Heads of Food and Drug Administration, Environmental Protection Agency,
and Department of Agriculture (July 2, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/microsites/ostp/modernizing_the_reg_system_for_biotech_products_memo
_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/B38G-5F9W] [hereinafter Coordinated Framework Executive
Memorandum]. Federal Regulators recognize this dilemma. Id. On July 2, 2015, the
Executive Office of the President issued a memorandum directing the three primary agencies
that regulate biotechnology products to update the Coordinated Framework, “develop a
long-term strategy to ensure that the Federal [biotechnology] regulatory system” is prepared
for the “future products of biotechnology,” and commission an expert analysis of the future
landscape of biotechnology products to support this effort. Id. at 4.
7
See infra Part II.
4
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intellectual property rights.8 This Article concludes that new legislation is
necessary in the near terms and, in Part IV, canvasses four major policy
issues that any new legislation must resolve. 9 Only a conscious and
comprehensive scheme based on updated legislation can adequately
regulate the risks of modern genetic engineering and simultaneously pave
the way for technological developments and new products that could save
lives and improve the environment.
II. PEELING OFF THE “SCIENCE DENIER” LABEL
Under the headline “Science that is Hard to Swallow,” the Washington
Post in 2015 featured an editorial about public opinion on GMOs that
began, “Sophisticated readers know a science denier when they see
one . . . .”10 The author, Fred Hiatt, noted that in a recent survey, eightyeight percent of scientists believed that genetically modified (“GM”) foods
were safe to eat, while only thirty-seven percent of the public thought so.11
The survey noted that it was the largest opinion difference between
scientists and the public on a range of scientific issues surveyed. 12 The
author opined that the public’s fears would be warranted only if plant
breeding itself, originating with Gregor Mendel, is unsafe, then lambasted
the public for obstructing technological progress that might feed the
hungry.13 Hiatt’s editorial compared those who believed GM foods are
unsafe to eat with those who disputed the safety and efficacy of
vaccination, with those who denied that climate change has
anthropogenic causes, and with those who disputed the theory of
evolution.14 The Washington Post is not alone in leveling this critique;
others in the media have painted GM labeling proponents as antiscience.15
Is it true that consumer concerns about genetically-engineered
products are scientifically invalid? Part II.A considers three different
categories of common consumer concerns—safety for human

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV–V.
10
See Hiatt, supra note 1.
11
See id.; see also Cary Funk & Lee Rainie, Public and Scientists’ Views on Science and Society,
PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/01/29/public-andscientists-views-on-science-and-society/ [https://perma.cc/3KYT-49SC].
12
See Funk & Rainie, supra note 11.
13
See Hiatt, supra note 1.
14
See id.
15
See Achenbach, supra note 1; Saletan, supra note 1.
8
9
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consumption, environmental or agro-environmental harms, and socioeconomic impacts—and identifies legitimate areas of concern. 16
A. Limited Consensus on Health Effects of Consuming GE Foods
Are GE foods safe to consume? Numerous scientific and popular
sources have claimed a scientific consensus that consumption of
genetically-engineered (“GE”) foods poses no risk to human health. 17
While most scientists and scientific bodies agree that most GE foods are
safe to consume, claims that the safety debate is “over” tend to overstate
the extent of scientific agreement.
First, the general conclusion: most scientific bodies agree that most of
the GE foods tested to date are probably safe for human consumption. In
its 2016 report on genetic engineering, the National Academy of Science’s
(“NAS”) “overall finding” on health risks was that “the committee found
no differences that implicate a higher risk to human health from GE foods
than from their non-GE counterparts.”18 While media reports have mostly
emphasized this finding, claiming that the NAS declared all GE foods to
be “safe,” they have also overstated their conclusions. 19 Similarly, other
scientific bodies have released opinions that generally validate the safety
of GE foods.20
Based on those opinions, fear-mongering about GE food consumption
is unwarranted; studies so far have not convincingly shown that GE foods
See infra Part II.A; see, e.g., 5 Reasons to Be Concerned about GMOs, GMO INSIDE.ORG,
http://gmoinside.org/top-5-gmo-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/CCL9-DRA4]; 10 Reasons to
Avoid GMOs, INST. FOR RESPONSIBLE TECH. (“IRT”), http://responsibletechnology.org/10reasons-to-avoid-gmos/ [https://perma.cc/2LME-JP7N].
17
See, e.g., Alessandro Nicolia et al., An Overview of the Last 10 Years of Genetically
Engineered Crop Safety Research, 34 CRIT. REV. BIOTECH. 77, 84 (2014); Michael White, The
Scientific Debate about GM Foods Is over: They’re Safe, PAC. STANDARD (Sept. 24, 2013),
https://psmag.com/the-scientific-debate-about-gm-foods-is-over-they-re-safe84697ee0b9a1#.hwl5dfcp6 [https://perma.cc/2UVP-47QY].
18
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, MEDICINE, GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED CROPS: EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS 149 (2016), https://www.nap.edu/
catalog/23395/genetically-engineered-crops-experiences-and-prospects
[https://perma.cc/WT67-N7HL] [hereinafter NATIONAL ACADEMIES].
19
See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Genetically Engineered Crops Are Safe, Analysis Finds, N.Y. TIMES
(May 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/18/business/genetically-engineeredcrops-are-safe-analysis-finds.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/622B-WZQZ]; see also Kelly
Servick, Once Again, U.S. Expert Panel Says Genetically Engineered Crops Are Safe to Eat, SCIENCE
(May 17, 2016), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/05/us-panel-releases-consensusgenetically-engineered-crops [https://perma.cc/3AA5-FV28].
20
See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions on Genetically Modified Foods, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
(“WHO”) (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.who.int/foodsafety/areas_work/food-technology
/faq-genetically-modified-food/en/#
[https://perma.cc/8HTD-FZD9]
[hereinafter
Frequently Asked Questions].
16
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are harmful to human health. But, read in context, the statements of these
health organizations are more qualified than any blanket assertion that all
GE foods are safe.21 The NAS report acknowledged the existence of
scientific uncertainty, stating that “many of the favorable institutional
statements about safety of foods from GE crops . . . contain caveats, for
example, ‘no overt consequences,’ ‘no effects on human health have been
shown,’ ‘are not per se more risky,’ and ‘are not likely to present risks for
human health.’”22 The committee noted that its own finding was stated
very carefully so as not to overstate the “safety” of GE foods or any other
foods.23 The report made a number of recommendations to help increase
scientific certainty, such as identifying in studies what level of difference
will be considered “biologically relevant;” conducting follow-up
experimentation using trusted research protocols, personnel, and
publication outlets where early published studies produced equivocal
results; and providing public funding in the United States for such followup studies.24 In a preface to the report, the chairman of the committee
wrote, “We received impassioned requests to give the public a simple,
general, authoritative answer about GE crops. Given the complexity of
GE issues, we did not see that as appropriate.”25
On many questions, the NAS report notes that data is limited. For
instance, with regard to the question of whether foods from GE crops may
affect gut microbes, the study concluded that the topic needs additional
research to reach a reliable conclusion.26 With regard to the impacts of
increased use of glyphosate in connection with glyphosate-resistant GE
plants, the report concluded that the potential harm of GE crops is
inconclusive to the degree that more research is needed to reach a higher
level of certainty on glyphosate’s potential harm. With regard to
questions concerning an increase in cancer incidences, allergies, or celiac
disease, the report noted that data was limited but based its conclusions
primarily on roughly equivalent increases between the United States and
Canada, where GE foods are consumed, and the United Kingdom, where
they are generally not consumed.27 The report concluded that these
comparisons in fact reflect a negative correlation between GE foods and
incidences of cancer.28 The report acknowledged, however, that these
comparisons also demonstrate that there is “no relationship between
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

See generally NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 18, at 113.
Id.
See id. at 10.
See id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 18, at 136, 144.
See id. at 137.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol51/iss2/6

Peck: The Failure of Federal Biotechnology Regulation

2017]

Biotechnology Regulation

489

cancer and GE foods because there can be a delay in the onset of cancer
that would obscure a trend, and one could hypothesize that something
else has occurred with GE foods in the United States that has lowered
cancer incidence and thus obscured a relationship.” 29
Other leading scientific organizations have also given their opinions
in carefully worded language that is not often captured by media reports
and have acknowledged the need for better safety assessments of new GE
products. For example, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) has
stated that GM foods currently on the market are unlikely to present risks
to human health, and no such impacts have been proven. 30 However,
WHO also states that GE food safety cannot be proven or disproven across
the board: “Different GM organisms include different genes inserted in
different ways. This means that individual GM foods and their safety
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis and that it is not possible to
make general statements on the safety of all GM foods.” 31 WHO
acknowledges three main areas of concern for human health: allergic
effects of transferred proteins; transfer of antibiotic-resistant to humans;
or migration of genes from GM plants into conventional crops or wild
relatives, which could have impacts on food production.32 Similarly, the
American Medical Association (“AMA”) has stated that “[t]here is no
evidence that unique hazards exist either in the use of rDNA techniques

29
Id. at 137. In this earlier 2004 report, the National Academy of Science (“NAS”)
acknowledged that, at the time, “no adverse health effects attributed to genetic engineering
have been documented in the human population.” Id. This statement is something of a
truism, however. Since no epidemiological studies on humans have been conducted, control
groups are not possible because genetically-modified organisms (“GMO”) foods are not
currently labeled and most people do not know if they have consumed them. See also Safety
of Genetically Engineered Foods: Approaches to Assessing Unintended Health Effects, NAT’L
ACADEMIES PRESS (2004), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/10977/safety-of-geneticallyengineered-foods-approaches-to-assessing-unintended-health
[https://perma.cc/P5P3RBS2]. Moreover, the report concluded that “there remain sizeable gaps in our ability to
identify compositional changes that result from genetic modification of organisms intended
for food; to determine the biological relevance of such changes to human health; and to
devise appropriate scientific methods to predict and assess unintended adverse effects on
human health.” Id. at 15. The report agreed that genetic engineering using genes from
diverse species has greater risk of producing unexpected effects than conventional crossbreeding. Id. at 66. The report recommended both pre- and post-market assessment
approaches to identify “unintended changes in the levels of nutrients, toxins, toxicants,
allergens, or other compounds” in foods subject to genetic modification of any kind,
including conventional cross-breeding and genetic engineering. Id. at 2.
30
See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 20.
31
Id.
32
Id.
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or in the movement of genes between unrelated organisms.” 33 At the same
time, however, the AMA also supports the implementation of safety
assessments for GMO foods to detect unintended effects, toxicity, or
allergenicity and to decrease use of antibiotic resistance markers in new
genetically-engineered products.34
Some recent studies of scientific opinion on the safety of GM foods
also concluded that the literature shows a low degree of scientific
consensus regarding the safety of GM foods and the need for further
research.35 One study examined eight systematic reviews, twenty-six
individual studies reporting adverse effects or uncertainties related to GM
foods fed to animals, and the opinions of professional societies, like the
NAS, the British Medical Association, and the Society of Toxicology. 36 Of
the eight systematic reviews, the author reported two reviews that found
evidence of serious health impacts on study animals and one study that
concluded that GM plants are safe—though distinct from non-modified
counterparts on non-health-related parameters.37 The remaining five
studies either reported some effects but did not draw conclusions about
their health significance, concluded that little evidence had shown GM
foods to be unsafe, but noted the limitations of the research to date, or
focused primarily on the limitations of the research.38 The author
concluded that no one can read these reviews and conclude that the
science has resolved the health effects of GMOs.39
33
H-480.958 Bioengineered (Genetically Engineered) Crops and Foods, AM. MED. ASS’N (2013),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/KIDdata/Tmy/2013HB-06527-R000305-AMA%20
Bioenginerred%20Crops%20and%20Foods-TMY.PDF [https://perma.cc/4Y77-6TV6].
34
See id.
35
See Sheldon Krimsky, An Illusory Consensus Behind GMO Health Assessment, SCI., TECH.
& HUMAN VALUES (Aug. 7, 2015), http://emerald.tufts.edu/~skrimsky/PDF/Illusory%
20consensus%20GMOs.PDF [https://perma.cc/2YVN-CXJY].
36
See id. at 12.
37
See id. at 12, 15; see also B.M. Maghari & A.M. Ardekani, Genetically Modified Foods and
Social Concerns, 3 AVICENNA J. MED. BIOTECHNOLOGY 109, 114–15 (2011); cf. C. Snell et al.,
Assessment of the Health Impact of GM Plant Diets in Long-Term and Multigenerational Animal
Feeding Trials: A Literature Review, 50 FOOD & CHEM. TOXICOLOGY 1134, 1146–47 (2012).
38
See A.S. Bawa & K.R. Anilakumar, Genetically Modified Foods: Safety, Risks and Public
Concerns—A Review, 50 J. FOOD SCI. & TECH. 1035, 1044 (2013); Jose L. Domingo & Jordi Gine
Bardonaba, A Literature Review on the Safety Assessment of Genetically Modified Plants, 37 ENV’T
INT’L 734, 739–40 (2011) (summarizing the 2011 literature review, which chronicles a
collection of research findings on studies on different species of animals); J.A. MaganaGomez & A.M. Calderon de la Barca, Risk Assessment of Genetically Modified Crops for Nutrition
and Health, 67 NUTRITION REV. 1, 14 (2008); W. Zhang & F. Shi, Do Genetically Modified Crops
Affect Animal Reproduction? A Review of the Ongoing Debates, 5 ANIMAL 1048, 1056–57 (2011);
Scientific Opinion on Application, European Food Safety Authority (EFSA-GMO-UK-2009-76) for
the Placing on the Market of Soybean MON87769, 12 EFSAJ. 1, 34 (2014).
39
See Krimsky, supra note 35, at 12, 15. With regard to the twenty-six individual studies,
Krimsky focused on the two that aroused the most controversy. See Stanley Ewen & Arpad
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Other sources agree that scientific debate persists. In 2016, the NAS
stated that “[t]he overall results of short-term and long-term animal
studies with rodents and other animals and other data on GE-food
nutrient and secondary compound composition convince[s] many . . . but
not all involved researchers . . . that currently marketed GE foods are as
safe as foods from conventionally bred crops.”40 Similarly, a 2015 joint
statement signed by more than 300 scientific researchers and scholars
stated that “the claim that [scientific consensus on GMO safety] does
exist . . . is misleading and misrepresents or outright ignores the currently
available scientific evidence and the broad diversity of scientific opinions
among scientists on this issue.”41 The joint statement asserts that the
available data on the safety of GMOs is inconclusive. 42 The authors took
issue with “a climate of complacency” arising from overstated claims of
consensus leading to carelessness in both safety assessment and
regulation of GE products.43 A European scientific organization has also

Pusztai, Effects of Diets Containing Genetically Modified Potatoes Expressing Galanthus nivalis
lectin on Rat Small Intestine, 354 LANCET 1353, 1354 (1999); Gilles-Eric Séralini et al., Long Term
Toxicity of a Roundup Herbicide and a Roundup-Tolerant Genetically Modified Maize, 50 FOOD &
CHEM. TOXICOLOGY 4221, 4229–30 (2012) (retracted 2014). The Ewen & Pusztai article
reported that rats fed a diet of GM foods, compared to controls, grew less well, showed
unusual changes in tissue, and had immune problems. Retraction Notice to “Long term Toxicity
of a Roundup Herbicide and a Roundup-Tolerant Genetically Modified Maize,” 63 FOOD & CHEM.
TOXICOLOGY 244 (2014). The Séralini article reported adverse effects in rats fed with GM
maize alone—for Monsanto’s herbicide glyphosate alone, and for GM maize with glyphosate
residues—including “severe hormone-dependent mammary, hepatic and kidney
disturbances.” Séralini et al., supra note 39, at 4230. Krimsky considered the firestorm of
controversy that followed both articles, including the unprecedented decision by the journal
Food and Chemical Toxicology to retract Séralini’s paper two years later, despite any evidence
of fraud or intentional misrepresentation of data, on the grounds that the paper was
“inconclusive.” See Retraction Notice, supra note 39. Analysis of the scientific validity of
these two studies is beyond the scope of this Article, since even serious limitations in current
research on GM food safety may support arguments in favor of greater federal regulatory
oversight of biotechnology. Id. Nevertheless, the amount of criticism generated against these
two studies and the unusual decision of a journal to retract a single animal study because its
results were “inconclusive,” raises questions about whether reactions were unbiased. Id.
40
NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 18, at 136 (emphasis added); see also Domingo &
Bardonaba, supra note 38, at 739–40 (presenting results of studies conducted on different
animal species); Angelika Hilbeck et al., No Scientific Consensus on GMO Safety, 27 ENVTL. SCI.
EUROPE 4, 7 (2015) (finding lack of consensus after comprehensive review of animal feeding
studies); Laura DeFrancesco, How Safe Does Transgenic Food Need to Be?, 31 NATURE BIOTECH.
794 (2013), http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v31/n9/full/nbt.2686.html?messageglobal=remove [https://perma.cc/7T83-GGRL] (discussing the dispute among researchers
and regulators concerning food safety risk assessment standards).
41
Hilbeck et al., supra note 40, at 2.
42
See id. at 1.
43
See id. at 2.
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made statements denying a scientific consensus around the safety of GE
foods.44
Are GMOs safe to consume? The simple answer to this question is—
we do not know with certainty. So far, most studies and scientific
organizations have not found evidence to indicate that GE foods are
generally unsafe. But scientific evidence remains insufficient, ambiguous,
or of questionable objectivity. Moreover, objective scientific groups
emphasize that all GE foods are distinct and that it is not possible to make
one-size-fits-all claims about their safety or lack of safety. Given the
limited data available, the scarcity of financially independent or publiclyfunded research, the variability from product to product, and the lack of
scientific consensus, reasonable people may differ with regard to the
appropriate level of precaution that should guide federal regulation and
individual consumer decisions.
B. Scientific Evidence of Adverse Environmental and Agronomic Impacts
While proponents of GE food labeling usually cite concerns about
health impacts, some consumers also seek to avoid purchasing products
made with GE ingredients because of concerns about harm to the
environment.45 Consumers whose desire for labeling of GE ingredients
derives at least in part from environmental concerns that in no sense deny
science, but rather call attention to ecological and agronomic impacts that
have so far remained fairly obscured in the debate over biotechnology
development, regulation, and impacts.
Numerous sources have reported environmental benefits from the
introduction of GE crops.46 Benefits include substitution of the glyphosate
for more-toxic herbicides, greater adoption of conservation tillage, and
decreased use of pesticides.47
Those benefits, however, may soon be offset as farmers attempt to
cope with the rise in glyphosate-resistant weeds, which have already
caused major crop losses. Four years after commercialization of
genetically-engineered seeds, the first glyphosate-resistant weed
appeared in a Delaware soybean field. 48 In the first fourteen years of

See, e.g., Statement: No Scientific Consensus on GMO Safety, ENSSER (Oct. 21, 2013).
See, e.g., GMO Facts, NON-GMO PROJECT (2016), http://www.nongmoproject.org/gmofacts/ [https://perma.cc/HC3K-ZZMD].
46
See, e.g., The Impact of Genetically Engineered Crops on Farm Sustainability in the United
States, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. (2010), http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes/
genengcrops.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5P3-RBS2] [hereinafter NAS 2010 Report].
47
See id. at 1–2.
48
See William Neuman & Andrew Pollack, Farmers Cope with Roundup-Resistant Weeds,
N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/business/energy44
45
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commercialization of glyphosate-resistant crops, ten glyphosate-resistant
weed species had appeared in the United States; by comparison, only
seven glyphosate-resistant species had appeared worldwide in the
previous thirty-six years.49 Four years later, in 2014, fourteen species of
glyphosate-resistant crops had appeared in thirty-two U.S. states.50 One
of the most troublesome weeds, glyphosate-resistant Palmer amaranth,
was reported in twenty-five U.S. states and in Brazil by 2015.51 The two
species of weeds that most widely appear in crops grown with Monsanto’s
glyphosate-resistant seeds are already resistant to other herbicides as
well.52
The appearance of glyphosate-resistant weeds has sent production
agriculture scrambling to outdated herbicides and more labor-intensive
strategies to control weeds.53 Some studies showed that despite more than
doubling farmers’ herbicide costs, herbicides were still insufficient to
control glyphosate-resistant Palmer amaranth, which has affected U.S.
cotton, maize, and soybean crops.54 In 2010, the president of the Arkansas
Association of Conservation Districts told the New York Times,
“[Glyphosate-resistant weed growth] is the single largest threat to
production agriculture that we have ever seen.” 55 The chairman of the
Georgia Cotton Commission was quoted as saying, “If we don’t whip this
thing, it’s going to be like the boll weevil did to cotton . . . [i]t will take it
away.”56
Farmers have shown reluctance to stop using glyphosate-resistant
crops when facing problems with controlling glyphosate-resistant weeds,
preferring instead to increase the amount and frequency of glyphosate
use, to use other herbicides in addition to glyphosate, or to increase their
environment/04weed.html?ref=business&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/57X2-K2H3]; Mark J.
VanGessel, Glyphosate-Resistant Horseweed from Delaware, 49 WEED SCI. 103, 103 (2001).
49
See NAS 2010 Report, supra note 46; see also Georgina Gustin, Roundup’s Potency Slips,
Foils Farmers: Resistant Weeds Are Spreading North, Adding Costs, Workload, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH (July 25, 2010), http://www.stltoday.com/business/roundup-s-potency-slipsfoils-farmers/article_b503aada-7f4e-5ded-86d4-8eb0703ef7bb.html [https://perma.cc/3K
FU-FF6H]; cf. Neuman & Pollack, supra note 48.
50
See Weeds Resistant to EPSP Synthase Inhibitors (G/9) by Species and Country, INT’L SURVEY
OF HERBICIDE RESISTANT WEEDS, http://www.weedscience.org/summary/MOA.aspx?
MOAID=12 [https://perma.cc/NZ5E-ET2Y] [hereinafter Heap Table].
51
See id.
52
See id.
53
See Lynn M. Sosnoskie & A. Stanley Culpepper, Glyphosate-Resistant Palmer Amaranth
(Amaranthus palmeri) Increases Herbicide Use, Tillage, and Hand-Weeding in Georgia Cotton, 62
WEED SCI. 393, 400 (2014).
54
See id.; see also Sarah M. Ward et al., Palmer Amaranth (Amaranthus palmeri): A Review,
27 WEED TECH. 12, 17 (2013).
55
Neuman & Pollack, supra note 48.
56
Id.
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use of tillage.57 In 2010, the NAS stated that “the environmental
consequences of those practices, if they were widely adopted by
producers of [herbicide-resistant] crops, would negate the environmental
benefits previously achieved [through use of GE crops].”58 Seed
developers have more recently received approvals for new seed varieties
with resistance to herbicides besides or in addition to glyphosate.59
Nevertheless, the NAS concluded in 2016 that “[w]eed resistance to
glyphosate is a problem” and that “integrated weed-management
approaches beyond simply spraying mixtures of herbicides are needed.”60
The report observed that empirical evidence is currently insufficient to
determine the most effective management strategy and that farmers will
be unable to move away from intensive use of herbicides without more
assistance from knowledgeable extension agents.61
While the impacts of glyphosate-resistance are among the primary
environmental concerns from GE crops, scientists have observed other
impacts that raise environmental concerns as well. These include: a shift
to more toxic pesticides as weeds develop glyphosate resistance; transfer
of GE traits to non-GE varieties of cultivated crops in neighboring fields,
which can reduce food crop biodiversity; transfer of GE traits to weedy
relatives, which may produce weed-management problems; and transfer
of GE traits to wild strains, which can then outcompete wild strains and
reduce genetic diversity available for crop improvement. 62 While the
scope of these environmental impacts remains uncertain, some
consumers’ concerns about these risks reflect not a denial of science, but
rather a high degree of sensitivity to the risk.
Moreover, new genetic engineering technologies raise the possibility
of new unintended environmental consequences. For example, recent
technological breakthroughs now permit scientists to proliferate genetic

57

See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., IMPACT OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS

ON FARM SUSTAINABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 75 (2010) [hereinafter FARM SUSTAINABILITY].

Id. at 77.
See 2,4-D- and Dicamba-Tolerant Crops—Some Facts to Consider, PURDUE EXTENSION (Nov.
2012), https://www.extension.purdue.edu/extmedia/id/id-453-w.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YD29-V4F3]; see also Petitions for Determination of Nonregulated Status, BIOTECHNOLOGY (Oct.
16, 2016), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/petitions_table_pending.shtml
[https://perma.cc/8BRV-K63Q].
60
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE ET AL., GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS: EXPERIENCES
AND PROSPECTS 90 (2016).
61
See id. at 89–90.
62
See FARM SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 57, at 107. In the United States, scientists have
documented at least fifteen crop species that hybridize with weedy relatives. Id. Since only
a few crops (sunflower, pecan, blueberry, and some squashes) were domesticated in the
United States, the risk to conservation of genetic diversity is less acute here than in countries
with more native species and landraces. Id.
58
59
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modifications throughout entire species—or even eliminate a species
entirely—in just a few generations.63 Scientists hope these techniques,
called gene drives, will lead to life-saving advances, such as the
elimination of malaria-carrying mosquitos.64 While this possibility holds
great promise for biological control of risks such as mosquito-spread
diseases, benefits of such controls must outweigh the harm, or the “fitness
cost,” to the target organism or its ecosystem.65 Moreover, the risk of
unintended and quickly irreversible consequences is substantial, as
scientists estimate that gene drive modifications may become fixed in a
population within tens of generations.66 Since those effects would almost
certainly cross borders, political and legal ramifications of ecological
changes would be complex.67
C. Consumer Concerns outside the Realm of Science
Finally, some consumers wish to avoid purchasing GM foods because
of economic or social concerns, about which science has nothing to say.68
Many of these impacts are well documented and significant. Some have
already resulted in multi-million dollar liability for seed developers, while
the full extent of economic and social costs cannot yet be estimated.69 A
few of these concerns are discussed below.

63
See Robert L. Unckless et al., Modeling the Manipulation of Natural Populations by the
Mutagenic
Chain
Reaction,
GENETICS
INVESTIGATION
(July
30,
2015),
http://www.genetics.org/content/early/2015/07/30/genetics.115.177592
[https://perma.cc/4S8U-ZWVY].
64
See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE ET AL., GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON: ADVANCING
SCIENCE, NAVIGATING UNCERTAINTY, AND ALIGNING RESEARCH WITH PUB. VALUES 1 (2016).
65
See Unckless et al., supra note 63 (“[T]he speed of the process presents reason for
considerable caution before considering a field release of such a construct . . . .”).
66
See Samantha Mathewson, Gene Editing Technology Could Have Serious Consequences,
Researchers Say, NATURE WORLD NEWS (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.natureworld
news.com/articles/17271/20151006/gene-editing-technology-serious-consequencesresearchers.htm [https://perma.cc/Z7YA-BC7M] (quoting lead study author saying
“[t]hat’s one of the things that is scary, if you imagine that one of these alleles gets into a
population that you don’t want it in”).
67
See Kevin M. Esvelt et al., Concerning RNA-Guided Gene Drives for the Alteration of Wild
Populations, ELIFE (July 17, 2014), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC4117217/ [https://perma.cc/8F7Q-K672].
68
See, e.g., GMO Facts: Frequently Asked Questions, NON GMO PROJECT (Oct. 16, 2016),
http://www.nongmoproject.org/learn-more/ [https://perma.cc/TZ3C-A4EH].
69
See infra Part C.1.
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Uncertainty for Farmers about Liability for Adventitious Presence of
GM Seed

GE traits in crops in one farmer’s field can be transferred by wind or
insects to cross-pollinate with non-GE crops in a different farmer’s field.70
This raises the possibility of intellectual property violations, since GE seed
may legally be grown only under licensing agreements between the seed
developer and the farmer.71 This raises several complicated and unsettled
legal issues for the farmer on whose land the non-licensed seed is found.
First, can the seed developer sue the farmer for violating its patent? If the
use is intentional, the answer is yes, but if the adventitious presence
occurred because of unintentional cross-pollination, then the answer is
no.72 Proving a farmer’s intent (or lack thereof), however, can be
complicated and costly.
Second, where GE seed has adventitiously appeared in non-GE fields,
who should bear the losses incurred when the non-GE farmer loses sales
to buyers that want only non-GE crops? This debate has been referred to
as the “fence in/fence out” dilemma, and tort law principles have not
resolved who should bear the burden of keeping GE and non-GE crops
separate in the fields (and losses when such strategies fail). 73 A federal
task force considered the possibility of establishing some type of
compensation mechanism to compensate farmers for such losses, but its
final report failed to make a definitive recommendation. 74
2.

Harm to Farmers and Damage to U.S. Trade Relations from Loss of
Foreign Markets

Neither the Coordinated Framework nor any other federal law
instructs the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) or any
See FARM SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 57, at 104.
See 2008 Monsanto Technology/Stewardship Agreement, GROWER LICENSING, MONSANTO
(Oct. 16, 2016), http://www.monsanto.com/sitecollectiondocuments/tug_sample.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XN67-HY9A].
72
See generally Benjamin M. Cole et al., Food for Thought: Genetically Modified Seeds as De
Facto Standard—Essential Patents, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 314, 326–27 (2014).
73
See Thomas P. Redick, Coexistence of Biotech and Non-GMO or Organic Crops, 19 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 39, 49–50 (2014).
74
See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ENHANCING COEXISTENCE: A REPORT
OF THE AC21 TO THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE 9 (Nov. 19, 2012) (reporting that
“[m]embers of the AC21 are not in agreement about the extent to which a systemic problem
exists and whether there is enough data to warrant a compensation mechanism to address
it”). The task force recommended that the United States Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”) gather data to evaluate the scope of the problem and, if it found that a
compensation mechanism was warranted, to model the mechanism after federal crop
insurance programs. Id. at 14–15.
70
71
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other agency to coordinate with regulators in other major markets to
coordinate approval. Since regulators in different countries will approve
traits at different times—and in some countries, regulators may decline to
approve some traits at all—farmers engaging in international sales of GE
crops must be certain that their harvests do not contain traits not approved
for sale in the destination country.75 Where shipments contain GE traits—
whether intentionally or adventitiously—that have not been approved in
the destination country, buyers in that country may seek damages for
losses related to those unapproved shipments, refuse to buy future
shipments from GE producers in the country of origin, and decline to buy
from non-GE producers in the country of origin because of concerns over
adventitious presence of the unapproved trait. 76
Asynchronous approvals have led to catastrophic harms to farmers of
both GE and non-GE seed. In a pending lawsuit against Syngenta, for
example, plaintiffs seek to recover billions of dollars arising out of market
losses related to asynchronous approvals between the United States and
China.77 Two Syngenta corn products genetically engineered with
pesticide resistance were deregulated by the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (“APHIS”) in 2010 and 2013.78 In the following years,
corn with those traits contaminated fields of other corn farmers in the
United States through cross-pollination and eventually infiltrated the
general domestic corn supply.79 In November 2013, China, which had not
yet approved the traits, began rejecting all corn from the United States
75
See Laura Rance, Gap Between Innovation, Approval Leaves Farmers Outside Looking In,
WINNIPEG FREE PRESS (May 28, 2016), http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/business/gapbetween-innovation-approval-leaves-farmers-outside-looking-in-381191781.html
[https://perma.cc/W7SX-L8A3].
76
See id. (providing steps that buyers can take when shipments containing GE traits
arrive).
77
See Ray Scherer, Lawsuits Seek Loss Recovery for Corn Farmers, ST. JOSEPH NEW-PRESS
(Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.newspressnow.com/news/local_news/lawsuits-seek-lossrecovery-for-corn-farmers/article_6d7f3b69-d496-529a-9dd6-7aa7df45f139.html
[https://perma.cc/9AAE-AQDH]; see also Scott+Scott, LLP, Scott+Scott, Attorneys at Law,
LLP Files Class Action on Behalf of Corn Farmers Harmed by Drop in U.S. Corn Prices—SYT,
GLOBENEWSWIRE
(Jan.
15,
2015),
https://globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2015/01/15/697835/10115808/en/Scott-Scott-Attorneys-at-Law-LLP-Files-ClassAction-on-Behalf-of-Corn-Farmers-Harmed-by-Drop-in-U-S-Corn-Prices-SYT.html
[https://perma.cc/GPQ5-YPGS].
78
See generally Regulation, Testing, and Deregulation of MIR162, SYNGENTACORNCASE (Oct.
18, 2016), http://www.syngentacorncase.com/about-the-case/case-updates-documents/
class-action/factual-allegations/regulation-testing-and-deregulation-of-mir162/
[https://perma.cc/R4T6-YTXM]; see also Determination of Nonregulated Status of Event 5307
Corn, USDA APHIS, (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/
10_33601p_det.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C7A-BW9L].
79
See Mem. Order at 51–52, In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d 1177
(D. Kan. 2015).
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containing the GE traits.80 In the lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged that
Syngenta misled the public about the timing and likelihood of China
approving the pesticide-resistance traits.81 Plaintiffs claim for damages
may total more than a billion dollars because they alleged that the decline
in corn prices due to the loss of the Chinese market harmed plaintiffs who
had not grown the GE corn as well as those that had.82
APHIS currently does not appear to coordinate approvals with
In response to proposed
regulators in major export markets. 83
rulemaking, commenters have pushed APHIS to consider coordination of
approvals with other major markets. 84 For example, in February 2016,
APHIS announced its intent to prepare a Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)
for potential changes to its regulation of biotechnology products. 85
APHIS’s preferred action alternative would likely have excluded some
products from APHIS permitting process. 86 The grain and oilseeds
industry association urged APHIS to ensure that any regulatory changes
are “comparable and compatible, to the maximum extent possible, with
regulatory approaches used by competent government authorities in
important U.S. export markets so as to minimize or avoid the risk of

80
See Ricardo Lopez, China Rejects Shipments of Genetically Modified Corn, L.A. TIMES (Dec.
27, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-mo-china-rejects-shipment-of-gmocorn-20131227-story.html [https://perma.cc/DE3E-WT9R]; see also Christina Sarich, Biotech
Outraged after China Rejects Several Billion Tons of GMO Corn, NATURAL SOC’Y (Jan. 8, 2015),
http://naturalsociety.com/biotech-outraged-china-rejects-several-billion-tons-gmo-corn/
[https://perma.cc/BE9X-EXK5].
81
See In re Syngenta AG MIR162 Corn Litigation, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1401 (D. Kan. 2014).
82
Mem. Order, supra note 79, at 3–4.
83
See, e.g., Corn Refiners Association et al., Joint Statement to APHIS on Part 340 EIS Notice
Biotech Regs 4-21-16 (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=APHIS2014-0054-0106 [https://perma.cc/HYZ7-DX75]. The authors of the letter state that their
“organizations also are extremely alarmed about what appears to this point to be a lack of
outreach by APHIS or on its behalf by other USDA agencies (e.g., the Foreign Agricultural
Service) concerning changes being contemplated to Part 340.” Id. at 3.
84
See id. at 4 (“[I]ncreasing lack of coherence in various nations’ regulatory systems
regarding safety reviews and approval of new biotech-enhanced events . . . have indeed
prevented or reduced access of U.S. crops to foreign markets and resulted in very significant
downward pressure on prices paid to farmers and reduced the economic value of U.S.
agricultural production . . . .”).
85
See Environmental Impact Statement; Introduction of the Products of Biotechnology, 81
Fed. Reg. 6225 (Feb. 5, 2016).
86
See Department of Agriculture, Environmental Impact Statement; Introduction of the
Products of Biotechnology, ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV. (Feb. 1, 2016),
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/federal_register/brs_regs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JTV8-F6BQ] (inviting public input on “potential justifiable exceptions or
exemptions that would exclude certain ‘products of biotechnology’ from APHIS”).
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market and trade disruptions.”87 It is unclear whether the Coordinated
Framework and the Plant Protection Act (“PPA”) give APHIS authority to
consider economic, rather than agronomic and environmental, impacts of
its regulations.88
3.

Lack of Market Incentives to Develop and Transfer Intellectual
Property Rights to Life-Saving Technologies

GM seed has been promoted as a way to dramatically decrease world
hunger and malnutrition.89 Numerous applications of genetic engineering
currently in the research and development pipeline might be beneficial to
farmers and consumers in developing countries. In a 2012 Food and
Agricultural Organization (“FAO”) conference on the biotechnology
pipeline in developing countries, participants identified a late blight
resistant potato in Bangladesh, a golden mosaic virus resistant common
bean in Brazil, a fungal resistant wheat in China, and many others. 90 The
most often-discussed example, known as “Golden Rice,” is genetically
engineered to produce beta carotene, a good source of vitamin A, to
reduce the incidence of blindness and other diseases in children whose
diets rely heavily on rice.91
Corn Refiners Ass’n et al., Joint Statement to APHIS on Notice of Intent to Prepare
Environmental Impact Statement under 7 CFR Part 340, at 2 (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.agripulse.com/ext/resources/pdfs/j/o/i/1/6/Joint-Statement-to-APHIS-on-Part-340-EISNotice-Biotech-Regs-4-21-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q63A-6BN5]. APHIS declined media
requests to comment on the issue. Philip Brasher, Grain Trade Alarmed by USDA Biotech Plans,
AGRI-PULSE COMMC’N INC. (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.agri-pulse.com/Grain-tradealarmed-by-USDA-biotech-plans-04272016.asp [https://perma.cc/3WR9-JPVL].
88
See Corn Refiners Ass’n, supra note 87, at 2–3.
89
J. Madeleine Nash, Grains of Hope, TIME (July 23, 2000), http://content.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,50576,00.html [https://perma.cc/5T56-SWRH] (exemplifying the
hope that GMO foods may provide a viable solution to malnutrition and world hunger).
90
See John Ruane, An FAO E-mail Conference on GMOs in the Pipeline in Developing
Countries: The Moderator’s Summary, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N. (“FAO”) (2013),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/017/ap998e/ap998e.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP9P-K9XP]; see
also Crop Biotech Update, INT’L SERV. FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS
(“ISAAA”) (June 22, 2016), http://www.isaaa.org/kc/cropbiotechupdate/newsletter/
default.asp?/Date=6/22/2016 [https://perma.cc/P8TB-ZKGQ].
91
Golden Rice has been widely discussed in the academic literature on genetic
engineering and has been subject to considerable controversy. See Peter Beyer et al., Golden
Rice: Introducing the Beta-Carotene Biosynthesis Pathway into Rice Endosperm by Genetic
Engineering to Defeat Vitamin A Deficiency, 132 J. NUTRITION 506S (2002); see also John
Christensen, SCIENTIST AT WORK: Ingo Potrykus; Golden Rice in a Grenade-Proof Greenhouse,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/21/science/scientist-atwork-ingo-potrykus-golden-rice-in-a-grenade-proof-greenhouse.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0 [https://perma.cc/3GGV-PR3A]. The Golden Rice controversy is largely outside the
scope of this work, and the author does not intend to imply any position for or against the
viability of the Golden Rice technology to deliver nutritional benefits. Golden Rice is
87
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To date, however, nearly all commercialized GM seed varieties have
been engineered with traits that benefit farmers in developed, not
developing, countries.92 The reasons are not science-driven, but marketdriven: private sector seed development corporations, like Monsanto,
have sufficient resources to develop new traits that might benefit
developing-country farmers, but have economic incentives to focus on
technologies that will be attractive to farmers in developed-country
markets.93 For example, after a professor of plant genomics at UC-Davis
pioneered a genetically-altered rice that resists Xanthomonas, Asia’s worst
rice blight, Monsanto and Pioneer originally sought to license the gene. 94
As the university was negotiating the terms of the deal, however,
Monsanto and Pioneer lost interest, and the technology has not yet been
brought to market.95 The developers of Golden Rice required the
assistance of the Rockefeller Foundation to negotiate licenses to the
seventy protected intellectual and technical property rights belonging to
thirty-two different companies and universities that were used in
developing the transgenic rice.96 Transfer of the technology to researchers
in developing countries to infuse the technology into locally-viable rice
varieties added an additional layer of complexity. 97
According to the FAO, genetic engineering for developing country
agriculture is being led by the public sector, the private sector, and some
public-private partnerships, with strong leadership by the public sector in
countries including Brazil, China, India, and Iran.98 As noted by a former
Syngenta executive in the FAO conference, the private sector is likely to
continue to focus on larger, more commercial crops, although a trend has

mentioned only to highlight the challenges expressed by the developers in obtaining
intellectual property rights and transferring those rights for public benefit.
92
See Petitions for Determination of Nonregulated Status, USDA APHIS (Oct. 2016),
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/petitions_table_pending.shtml
[https://perma.cc/6GAA-TGQS].
93
See A. Max Jarvie, Productivity and Diversity in Research and Agriculture: Improving the
IPR Landscape for Food Security, 40 WM. & MARY ENVT’L L. & POL’Y REV. 849, 868–69 (2016).
94
See Frederick Kaufman, Genetically Monetized Food, SLATE (Dec. 20, 2012),
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/food/2012/12/plant_patent_law_why_overhauling_i
t_will_do_more_to_help_the_food_movement.html [https://perma.cc/E6M7-FJZE].
95
See id.
96
See C.S. Prakash & Gregory Conko, Relevance of Genetically Modified Crops to Developing
Countries, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 437, 442 (2003); see also Ann Weilbaecher, Diseases Endemic in
Developing Countries: How to Incentivize Innovation, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 281, 295 (2009).
97
See Prakash & Conko, supra note 96, at 442–43.
98
See Chantal Phol Nielsen & Kym Anderson, Genetically Modified Foods, Trade, and
Developing Countries: Is Golden Rice Special?, AGBIOWORLD (Oct. 2016), http://www.agbio
world.org/biotech-info/topics/goldenrice/specialgoldrice.html [https://perma.cc/8QPN6XLM].
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begun for the private sector to address subsistence crops to some degree. 99
Until the public and private sector can overcome these market barriers to
greater research and development in genetic engineering for developingcountry agriculture, claims of lifesaving impacts of genetic engineering
may reasonably fail to convince many developed-country consumers of
the life-saving value of GE crops.
III. THE FAILURE OF THE COORDINATED FRAMEWORK
On July 2, 2015, President Obama created an inter-agency task force
among the USDA, Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), and
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to update the Coordinated
Framework and develop a strategy to prepare for changes in
biotechnology.100 From the President’s charge, it is not clear whether the
work of the task force will be limited to adjusting federal regulatory
authority based on current statutes (Plant Protection Act, Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (“PPA,” “FDCA,” and “FIFRA” respectively)), or
whether the task force is also authorized to request passing new
legislation to expand or change federal agency statutory authority. 101 The
memorandum identifies the one-year objectives of the task force as the
“development of an updated [Coordinated Framework] to clarify the roles
and responsibilities of the agencies that regulate the products of
biotechnology,” as well as the formulation of a long-term risk assessment
strategy and the commissioning of an independent analysis of future
biotechnology products. 102
To what extent can and will the federal agencies reinterpret the scope
of their existing authority under the relevant statutes in a way that
addresses persistent consumer concerns? Are those statutes sufficiently
broad to allow the agencies to exercise jurisdiction in a way that
meaningfully responds to such concerns? This Part addresses failures of
99
See All Messages from the FAO 2012 E-mail Conference on “GMOs in the Pipeline: Looking
to the Next Five Years in the Crop, Forestry, Livestock, Aquaculture and Agro-Industry Sectors in
Developing Countries,” FAO (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/
user_upload/biotech/docs/conf18msgs.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP9P-K9XP] (providing an
e-mail from the participant stating that “[m]ajor R&D based companies are bound to focus
on the larger and more commercial crops as that is where they will get the best returns and
they have financial obligations to their shareholders”). According to the participant, forces
driving the trend include advances in plant genomics; diversification of private sector
research from corn, soybeans, and cotton into rice and wheat; increasing prominence of
corporate social responsibility; and increasing the market potential of developing countries.
Id.
100
See Coordinated Framework Exec. Mem., supra note 4.
101
See id. at 3.
102
Id. at 3.
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the Coordinated Framework to address consumer concerns—failures
arising both from agency interpretation of existing authority and from
lack of agency authority to regulate current and emerging products or
ancillary impacts of those products.
A. Statutory Bases for Agency Jurisdiction under the Coordinated Framework
In the Coordinated Framework, the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy (“OSTP”) divided regulatory authority for
agricultural biotechnology among three federal agencies: the USDA,
which regulates the testing and commercialization of new agricultural
biotech products; the FDA, which regulates the introduction and
marketing of foods created through the use of genetic engineering; and
the EPA, which regulates genetically-altered microorganisms and
pesticide properties of genetically-engineered plant varieties.103 Each of
these agencies regulates under statutes that pre-date commercial
agricultural biotechnology. The Coordinated Framework located the
FDA’s authority primarily in the FDCA, a 1938 act that includes
authorization for the FDA to ensure food safety through regulation of food
additives and misbranding.104 The USDA’s authority was identified as
stemming primarily from a law that dates back to the Federal Plant Pest
Act of 1957, reorganized in the PPA, which gave the USDA jurisdiction
over bacteria and viruses.105 The Coordinated Framework identified the
EPA’s authority as deriving from the relatively modern pesticide and
toxics control laws of the 1970s, including FIFRA and the Toxic Substances
Control Act (“TSCA”).106

See Neil A. Belson, U.S. Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology: An Overview, 3
AGBIOFORUM 15, 15 (2000) (describing the three federal agencies that have regulatory
authority for agricultural biotechnology).
104
See 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2012) (defining the term “food additive”); § 321(n) (explaining
what “misbranding” means); § 371 (providing the authority to promulgate regulations);
§ 372 (describing the process for examinations and investigations); Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (introducing the definitions of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act).
105
Plant Pest Regulations; Update of Current Provisions, 66 Fed. Reg. 51340 (proposed Oct.
9, 2001) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 330) (giving a brief explanation of how the Federal Plant
Pest Act (“PPA”) has evolved over the years).
106
See Chris A. Wozniak et al., Regulation of Genetically Engineered Microorganisms under
FIFRA, FFDCA, and TSCA, EPA (Oct. 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2015-09/documents/ch4-wozniak-etal-fifra-ffdca-tsca-112012_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
5RN8-F2J4] (expressing that FIFRA and TSCA are toxic control laws that give the EPA
regulatory authority of biotechnology products).
103
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B. Insufficient Statutory Authority for USDA
The first generation of biotechnology typically used Agrobacterium as
a vector to insert the DNA of one species into the cells of a different
species.107 Thus, the Office of Science and Technology Policy could argue
that the USDA’s authority over plant pests also gave it authority over
agricultural products created using these bacterial vector insertions of
DNA (even though the viruses, once inserted, were not active and did not
pose the types of threats that motivated the PPA).108 As long as developers
used bacterial or viral vectors to deliver DNA to target organisms,
however, the PPA arguably provided an adequate jurisdictional hook.
But biotechnology developers now have tools other than viruses at their
disposal to make genetic modifications to target organism DNA. These
tools include a “gene gun” that shoots DNA into cells without the use of
any bacterial or viral vector and genome-editing technologies that allow
scientists to directly edit or delete DNA rather than inserting anything.
Biotechnology now, in 2016, stands on the verge of a technological
revolution that will allow scientists to edit genes easily and with minimal
cost.
That technological revolution is based on changes in the mechanisms
scientists use to accomplish genetic changes in an organism. When the
Coordinated Framework was released in 1986, all GE plants had been
produced by using Agrobacterium tumefaciens as the vector to deliver the
DNA to the species of interest.109 The administration’s decision in the
Coordinated Framework to locate the FDA, USDA, and EPA statutory
authority in the FDCA, PPA, and FIFRA was based on the assumption that
bacteria would continue to be the mechanism for accomplishing the
See Lan-Ying Lee & Stanton B. Gelvin, T-DNA Binary Vectors and Systems, 146
PHYSIOLOGY 325, 325 (2008), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2245830/
pdf/pp1460325.pdf [https://perma.cc/L797-ZANB].
108
See Alex Camacho et al., Genetically Engineered Crops that Fly under the US Regulatory
Radar, 32 NATURE BIOTECH. 1087, 1088–89 (2014), http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/
v32/n11/pdf/nbt.3057.pdf [https://perma.cc/69GQ-WY7E]. In the PPA, Congress found
that “the detection, control, eradication, suppression, prevention, or retardation of the spread
of plant pests or noxious weeds is necessary for the protection of the agriculture,
environment, and economy of the United States.” 7 U.S.C. § 7701 (2012). A “plant pest” is
defined as:
any living stage of any of the following that can directly or indirectly
injure, cause damage to, or cause disease to any plant or plant product:
(A) A protozoan, (B) A nonhuman animal, (C) A parasitic plant, (D) A
bacterium, (E) A fungus, (F) A virus or viroid, (G) An infectious agent
or other pathogen, (H) Any article similar to or allied with any of the
articles specified in the preceding subparagraphs.
§ 7702.
109
See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 18.
107
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genetic modifications.110 Tellingly, however, the Coordinated Framework
was out of date nearly as soon as it was written; within months, scientists
began to publicize successful inventions of genetically engineered plants
through a process called particle bombardment, or the “gene gun” that
did not rely on bacteria to transfer genetic material.111 Using a gene gun,
scientists can coat microparticles with RNA or DNA and accelerate or
shoot the particles to pierce cell walls of the plant.112 The resultant
organism expresses the inserted genetic codes. 113 Since no plant pest is
involved, APHIS’s jurisdiction under the PPA is not triggered.114 Another
type of product already in use are null segregants, in which a transgenic
parental line and a nontransgenic elite line are crossed to produce
nontransgenic progeny: the final product does not include the material
used to transfer the new DNA, and thus does not trigger APHIS
jurisdiction.115
Even more critical, new technologies or technologies now on the
horizon that do not rely on plant pests will make direct genome editing
fast, easy, and cheap.116 Genome editing, an important class of new
technologies, uses nucleases directed to a specific site on the DNA strand
to delete, add, or change targeted DNA sequences in an organism. 117
Developers have used several different classes of these nucleases, most of

See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, supra note 4.
See T.M. Klein et al., High-Velocity Microprojectiles for Delivering Nucleic Acids into Living
Cells, 327 NATURE 70, 70 (1987).
112
See id. at 71.
113
See What Is Genetic Engineering and How Does It Work?, AG BIOSAFETY (2005),
http://agbiosafety.unl.edu/basic_genetics.shtml [https://perma.cc/NS7F-89XS].
114
See, e.g., Michael C. Gregoire, Confirmation of Regulatory Status/Kentucky Bluegrass (Poa
pratensis L.) (July 1, 2011), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/scotts_
kbg_resp.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ97-ZDML] (introducing a letter from Michael C.
Gregoire, the Deputy Administrator for APHIS, to Dr. Richard Shank, the Senior Vice
President for Scotts Miracle-Gro Company). In his letter, Gregoire concluded with the
following:
Because no plant pests, unclassified organisms, or organisms whose
classification is unknown were used to genetically engineer this variety
of GE Kentucky bluegrass, APHIS has no reason to believe it is a plant
pest and therefore does not consider the Kentucky bluegrass described
in the letter dated September 13, 2010 to be regulated under 7 CFR part
340 and is not subject to the plant pest provisions of the PPA.
Id.
115
See Camacho, supra note 108, at 1088.
116
See Amy Maxmen, Easy DNA Editing Will Remake the World, WIRED (Aug. 2015),
https://www.wired.com/2015/07/crispr-dna-editing-2/ [https://perma.cc/H773-6NH3].
117
See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 18, at 241; see also Nicholas J. Baltes & Daniel F.
Voytas, Enabling Plant Synthetic Biology through Genome Engineering, 33 TRENDS IN BIOTECH.
120, 125
(2015), http://www.ask-force.org/web/Genomics/Baltes-Enabling-plantsynthetic-biology-genome-editing-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5KV-B8QP].
110
111
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which are best known by their space age-sounding acronyms: ZFNs,
TALENs, and CRISPR.118
CRISPR, the most promising of these techniques, accomplishes
genetic mutations using two molecules—the Cas9 nuclease, which cuts
both strands of DNA at a specific location to allow the mutation, and the
guide RNA, a sequence of about twenty base pairs that guides Cas9 to the
target location of the genome modification. 119 The breaks in DNA are
repaired by the cell, leading to deletions, insertions, or rearrangements
using the template RNA sequence.120 The CRISPR/Cas9 system, which
was based on the discovery of a similar natural system in some bacteria to
resist viruses, is simple and cheap to use because it only requires scientists
to synthesize the short, twenty-nucleotide RNA sequence.121
Applications for genome editing using site-specific nucleases,
especially CRISPR/Cas9, are promising for both human and animal
welfare.122 In agriculture, for example, researchers are working to
introduce into dairy cattle a genetic variant that causes into some beef
cattle to lack horns.123 Farmers often de-horn dairy cattle, which are kept
118
See Thorben Sprink et al., Plant Genome Editing by Novel Tools: TALEN and Other Sequence
Specific Nucleases, 32 CURRENT OPINION IN BIOTECH. 47, 47 (2015), http://ac.elscdn.com/S0958166914001979/1-s2.0-S0958166914001979-main.pdf?_tid=bf163418-8fc511e6-a6dc-00000aab0f6c&acdnat=1476199195_da7d604f14efe49d0d890c8c3e5353bd
[https://perma.cc/VHH8-P5UN]; NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 18, at 242.
119
See Baltes & Voytas, supra note 117, at 124; see also What Is CRISPR-Cas9?, YOUR GENOME
(last updated June 07, 2016), http://www.yourgenome.org/facts/what-is-crispr-cas9
[https://perma.cc/DSP6-GKXF]; Khaoula Belhaj et al., Editing Plant Genomes with
CRISPR/Cas9 System for Plant Genome Editing and Beyond, 31 BIOTECH. ADVANCES 41, 41
(2015),
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0734975014001931
[https://perma.cc/4Y8G-ZJEP]; Luisa Bortesi & Rainer Fischer, The CRISPR/Cas9 System for
Plant Genome Editing and Beyond, 33 BIOTECH. ADVANCES 41, 41 (2015); S. Antony Ceasar et
al., Insert, Remove or Replace: A Highly Advanced Genome Editing System Using CRISPR/Cas9,
BIOCHIMICA ET BIOPHYSICA ACTA (BBA)—MOLECULAR CELL RES. (June 24, 2016),
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167488916301781
[https://perma.cc/K3P9-X5PE]; NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 18, at 244.
120
See Bortesi & Fischer, supra note 119, at 41.
121
See Martin Jinek et al., A Programmable Dual-RNA–Guided DNA Endonuclease in Adaptive
Bacterial Immunity, 337 SCIENCE 816 (Aug. 17, 2012); see also Ruud Jansen et al., Identification
of Genes That Are Associated with DNA Repeats in Prokaryotes, 43 MOLECULAR MICROBIOLOGY
1565, 1565 (2002), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1046/j.1365-2958.2002.02839.x/
full [https://perma.cc/5A95-MWVX]; Belhaj et al., supra note 119, at 76.
122
See Dana Carroll & R. Alta Charo, The Societal Opportunities and Challenges of Genome
Editing, 16 GENOME BIOLOGY 242, 242 (2015).
123
See Wenfang Tan et al., Efficient Nonmeiotic Allele Introgression in Livestock Using Custom
Endonucleases, 110 PROCEEDINGS OF NAT’L ACADEMY SCI. 16526, 16527 (2013),
http://www.pnas.org/content/110/41/16526.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QDF-HLTC];
Wenfang Tan et al., Precision Editing of Large Animal Genomes, 80 ADVANCES IN GENETICS 37,
70–72 (2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3683964/pdf/nihms
471281.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM47-4AW6].
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in close quarters, for safety reasons, but physical de-horning methods are
invasive, painful, and expensive. 124 Introducing the trait through
traditional cross-breeding would result in loss of favorable traits for dairy
production, but genome editing could introduce the variant into existing
dairy herds without interfering with other, more desirable traits.125 In
medicine, genome editing is being used to explore the possibility of
knocking out the gene for CCR5, the functional co-receptor in T-cells used
by the HIV-1 virus.126 People who naturally lack the CCR5 gene may
become infected with the virus but do not become sick because their Tcells are resistant to being killed.127 Knocking out the CCR5 gene in bone
marrow stem cells might provide long-term HIV-resistant T-cells to the
recipient.128
The challenge of these technologies for USDA jurisdiction is that they
do not rely on bacterial or viral vectors to accomplish the desired genetic
modification. Without some form of plant pest present in the new
product, APHIS has no grounds to exercise jurisdiction under the PPA.
Since no general statute gives APHIS jurisdiction over any form of
biotechnology as such (a more adaptable type of process-based approach
to regulation), nor over any new plant variety presenting novel risks (a
product-based approach to regulation), the APHIS cannot regulate or will
not be able to regulate most new plant varieties created using biolistics,
site-directed nucleases like ZFNs, TALENs, and CRISPR, and any other
new methods that do not incorporate plant pests into the product
organism.
This gap in APHIS oversight already exists and is expected to explode
in the near future as CRISPR technology advances. Between 2011 and
2015, developers submitted letters of inquiry to APHIS regarding novel
products, seeking to know whether the products would be regulated. 129
Of the forty-nine products for which letters of inquiry were submitted to
APHIS, only four were determined by APHIS to involve plant pests that

124
See Bruno Graf & Markus Senn, Behavioral and Physiological Responses of Calves to
Dehorning by Heat Cauterization with and without Local Anesthesia, 62 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV.
SCI. 153 153–54 (1999) http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016815919800
2184 [https://perma.cc/L2P8-KR7T].
125
See Carroll & Charo, supra note 122, at 242–43.
126
See Pablo Tebas et al., Gene Editing of CCR5 in Autologous CD4 T Cells of Persons Infected
with HIV, 370 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 901, 901 (2014), http://www.natap.org/
2014/HIV/nejmoa1300662.pdf [https://perma.cc/6V64-JMX6].
127
See Carroll & Charo, supra note 122, at 245.
128
See id.
129
See, e.g., APHIS, Am I Regulated under 7 CFR Part 340?, APHIS (June 8, 2016),
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology/am-i-regulated
[https://perma.cc/J5F6-2SA6].
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would give APHIS jurisdiction.130 APHIS has indicated lack of regulatory
jurisdiction over products created using biolistics (18), meganuclease
deletions or substitutions (3), ZFNs (2), and TALENs (5).131 Smaller
laboratories and public institutions may already be deploying these
technologies as a strategy for avoiding federal regulation. 132 Because
CRISPR is simple and inexpensive, the technology may soon give rise to
an explosion of new genetically engineered organisms from even very
small research laboratories. 133
The failure to capture new genome-editing technologies in federal
regulatory authority may have safety consequences. Although these
technologies offer important advancements over transgenic modifications
because of their specificity and ability to limit off-target effects, techniques
like CRISPR are not without risk that off-target effects will occur.134
Without regulatory oversight, unintended consequences may occur and
introduce risks that are not known until after commercialization and
widespread release of the organism.
At the same time, other new genetic engineering technologies raise the
possibility of too much regulation. These new products of genetic
engineering may not raise the same level of risk, or generate the same level
of public concern, as traditional transgenic products, but might
nevertheless be subject to the same level of oversight under the PPA if
accomplished using bacterial vectors. For example, J.R. Simplot has
developed a variety of potato using a technique known as intragenesis. 135
In intragenesis, developers package various plant DNAs from varieties of
the target crop or its sexually compatible relatives, combine them into a
gene delivery cassette, and insert them into the target organism.136 Unlike
transgenic organisms, which combines DNA from non-sexuallycompatible species, these intragenic organisms could be made through

See NAS 2010 Report, supra note 46, at 330 (Table 9-3); see also Camacho et al., supra note
108, at 1090.
131
See NAS 2010 Report, supra note 46, at 330 (Table 9-3).
132
See Camacho et al., supra note 108, at 1087.
133
See Maxmen, supra note 116.
134
See Heidi Ledford, Enzyme Tweak Boosts Precision of CRISPR Genome Edits, NATURE (Jan.
6, 2016), http://www.nature.com/news/enzyme-tweak-boosts-precision-of-crispr-genome
-edits-1.19114 [https://perma.cc/FKF6-VP8P]; see also Benjamin P. Kleinstiver et al., HighFidelity CRISPR—Cas9 Nucleases with No Detectable Genome-Wide Off-Target Effects, 528
NATURE 490, 490 (2016), http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v529/n7587/pdf/nature
16526.pdf [https://perma.cc/M892-LLUR].
135
See I.B. Holme et al., Intragenesis and Cisgenesis as Alternatives to Transgenic Crop
Development, 11 PLANT BIOTECH. 395, 398 (2013) (noting that J.R. Simplot has developed
intragenic potatoes).
136
See NAS 2010 Report, supra note 46, at 37 (stating that varieties of crop DNA are
combined and inserted into the cell in intragenesis).
130
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conventional breeding, just less efficiently. 137 While intragenic organisms
may use Agrobacterium-mediated transformation and thus trigger
APHIS’s jurisdiction under the PPA, the use of cisgenesis has triggered
debate about whether these organisms pose the same level of risk as
transgenic organisms and whether they should be regulated the same. 138
C. Insufficient Statutory Authority for the FDA
Like the USDA’s authority under the PPA, the Reagan
Administration’s decision to locate the FDA’s statutory authority in the
FDCA was also based on the assumption that genetic engineering
involved transgenic organisms.139 The FDA’s jurisdiction over GMO
foods derives from the FDCA, which allows the FDA to regulate “food
additives.”140 Since the first genetically-engineered foods involved the
insertion of new DNA into a plant’s genome using bacterial vectors, that
generation of GMO foods arguably fell within the statutory definition of
a food additive: “any substance the intended use of which results or may
reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a
component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food.” 141
If the FDA had chosen to require new GE foods to go through premarket safety review as food additives, regulatory oversight and public
participation would be significant. Under full pre-market safety review
for food additives, food producers are required to submit a petition to the
FDA demonstrating safety of the food, accompanied by supporting data
generated by scientifically accepted methods. 142 The FDA may also
require the petitioner to submit samples of the additive for testing, and
provide descriptions of production methods and facilities. 143 The FDA is
required to make an independent determination within ninety days as to

See id. (comparing the sexual compatibility of transgenic and intragenic organisms).
See Henk J. Schouten et al., Cisgenic Plants Are Similar to Traditionally Bred Plants:
International Regulations for Genetically Modified Organisms Should Be Altered to Exempt
Cisgenesis, 7 EMBO REP. 750, 750 (2006), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC1525145/pdf/7400769.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RJ8-RWGT]; but see Eva Sirinathsinghji,
Cisgenesis Is Still Genetic Modification with All the Attendant Risks, INST. OF SCI. IN SOC’Y (Aug.
14, 2013), http://www.i-sis.org.uk/Cisgenesis_is_still_Genetic_Engineering_with_all_
attendant_risks.php [https://perma.cc/KWZ4-MZRG].
139
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26,
1986; see also FDA, Statement of Policy for Regulating Biotechnology Products, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,309–23,312 (June 26, 1986).
140
See 21 U.S.C. § 348 (2012).
141
§ 321(s).
142
See § 348(b)(2).
143
See § 348(b)(3)–(4).
137
138
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the safety of the food before the food can be marketed.144 The regulation
to approve the additive proposed by the petitioner must be published
within thirty days of filing; although the FDCA does not mandate preorder notice and comment, the FDA as a practical matter receives or
invites public comment on the proposed regulation.145 Orders issued by
the FDA may be stayed pending a challenge by any person adversely
affected and are subject to judicial review. 146
In a 1992 policy statement, however, the FDA announced a
presumption that all GE foods are safe and thus exempt from food
additive pre-market safety review process.147 A “food additive,” as
defined in the statute, includes substances described above only “if such
substance is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by
scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety, as having been
adequately shown through scientific procedures . . . to be safe under the
conditions of its intended use . . . .”148 According to the FDA, all foods
derived from genetic engineering fall into this generally recognized as safe
(“GRAS”) exemption from the pre-market safety review process.149 The
FDA reasoned, that “transferred genetic material [nucleic acids] . . . are
present in the cells of every living organism . . . and do not raise a safety
concern as a component of food. In regulatory terms, such material is
presumed to be GRAS.”150
As a result of this presumption, all foods produced using GE are
exempt from the pre-market safety review process for food additives
unless the intended expression of the genetic material differs significantly
from substances already found in food. 151 Subsequent litigation showed
that this presumption was questioned even by scientists within the FDA
at the time it was announced.152 The FDA’s GRAS presumption and its

144
§ 348(c)(1)–(3). The statute states that no “regulation shall issue if a fair evaluation of
the data before the Secretary . . . (A) fails to establish that the proposed use of the food
additive, under the conditions of use to be specified in the regulation, will be safe.” Id.
145
§ 348(b)(5). See also Lars Noah & Richard A. Merrill, Starting from Scratch?: Reinventing
the Food Additive Approval Process, 78 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 329, 371 (1998).
146
See § 348(e)–(g).
147
Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984,
22,990 (May 29, 1992) [hereinafter FDA Statement of Policy].
148
§ 321(s).
149
See FDA Statement of Policy, supra note 147, at 22,990.
150
Id.
151
See id.
152
See Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 177 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see
also Edwin J. Mathews, Memorandum from Dr. Edwin J. Mathews to the Toxicology Section of the
Biotechnology Working Group. Subject: “Analysis of the Major Plant Toxicants,” (Oct. 28, 1991),
http://biointegrity.org/FDAdocs/02/OEM1V.GIF [https://perma.cc/358S-ARTU]; Louis
J. Pribyl, Comments from Dr. Louis J. Pribyl re: the “Biotechnology Draft Document, 2/27/92”
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consequences also raise democratic concerns: without pre-market safety
review, no public record of the FDA food safety approvals is created, and
the public is deprived of any opportunity to review or comment on those
decisions. Given the scientific uncertainty about the health effects of
consuming GMOs, this lack of transparency has led to considerable
consumer distrust of the FDA’s determinations. The FDA encourages a
voluntary, non-public consultation process, which, as a matter of practice,
all developers have utilized before bringing a new GMO food to market. 153
Moreover, it is unclear whether foods produced with new genetic
engineering technologies will even fall within the FDCA definition of
“food additive,” which applies only to substances that “becom[e] a
component or otherwise affect[] the characteristics of any food.”154 In its
1992 policy statement, the FDA stated, “[i]n the case of foods derived from
new plant varieties, it is the transferred genetic material and the intended
expression product or products that could be subject to food additive
regulation, if such material or expression products are not GRAS.” 155 But
new GE techniques do not necessarily involve transferring any material
into the plant products at all: genome editing techniques like CRISPR, for
example, directly edit the genome of the target organism without inserting
any new material.156
The “food additive” definition is deliberately broad, encompassing
not only substances that become final components of the food but also
substances used in production, manufacturing, and other phases of the
food supply chain, if those substances are intended to affect the
characteristics of the food.157 Nevertheless, the definition hinges on the
existence of a “substance.”158 Under longstanding federal biotechnology
policy, however, a genetic engineering process is differentiated from the
genetic engineering product.159 As long as the FDA adheres to this policy

(Mar. 6, 1992), http://biointegrity.org/FDAdocs/04/OPCOM1V.GIF [https://perma.cc/
P4TH-JFZM].
153
See FDA Statement of Policy, supra note 147, at 22, 984–91; Consultation Procedures under
FDA’s 1992 Statement of Policy—Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, FDA (June 1996,
revised Oct. 1997), http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocuments
RegulatoryInformation/ucm096126.htm [https://perma.cc/Q5Q9-566B]; see also Premarket
Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, Fed. Reg. 4,706 (Jan. 18, 2001); cf. Proposed Rule,
Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706, 4,711.
154
21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2012).
155
FDA Statement of Policy, supra note 147, at 22,990.
156
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
157
See § 321(s).
158
See id.
159
See Exercise of Federal Oversight within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned
Introductions of Biotechnology Products into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. 6,753, 6,755 (Feb.
27, 1992) (“No conceptual distinction exists between genetic modification of plants and
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choice, it will be difficult to stretch the definition of “food additive” to
accommodate foods produced through genetic engineering processes that
do not involve the addition of any “substance” even in the production
phase. Without the jurisdictional hook of food additive review under the
FDCA, it is unclear whether the FDA will have any jurisdiction over new
genetically-engineered foods, even the current voluntary pre-market
consultation process. Even the FDA’s authority to remove unsafe
products from the market is based on its jurisdiction over “adulterated
foods,” which are defined as “substances” that render the food injurious
to health.160 The definition also excludes any substance that is “not an
added substance . . . if the quantity of such substance in such food does
not ordinarily render it injurious to health.” 161 GE foods with no “added
substance” may evade the FDA’s recall authority even in the event of a
verified health hazard.
D. Unduly Limited Role for EPA
Despite the risks to the agricultural and the broader environment
from the use of genetically-engineered crops, the Coordinated Framework
designates relatively little EPA oversight. The EPA regulates substances
that are genetically engineered to control pests under FIFRA. 162 Like other
pesticides, most genetically-engineered pesticidal substances (called
plant-incorporated protectants, or PIPs) must be safety-tested and
registered with the EPA before they may be distributed commercially. 163
The EPA also regulates genetically-engineered microorganisms under
TSCA.164 Under TSCA, any organization using a chemical substance that
may present an unreasonable risk to health or the environment must
submit a premanufacture notification to the EPA.165
Despite potential environmental risks such as GE species crossing
with wild relatives and the development of herbicide-resistant
“superweeds,” the EPA does not have authority to control the
environmental impacts of most of these products. With the EPA’s limited
statutory jurisdiction, most federal monitoring of environmental impacts

microorganism by classical methods or by molecular techniques that modify DNA and
transfer genes.”).
160
§ 342(a)(1).
161
Id.
162
7 U.S.C. § 136–136y (2012); see also 40 C.F.R. § 725.1(a) (2016).
163
See § 136a(a); see also § 136a(c)(5).
164
See 15 U.S.C. § 2601–95(d) (2012).
165
See § 2605(a) (regulating “chemical substance or mixture[s]” that “present[s] or which
will cause it to present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment”); see also
§ 2604 (citing the premanufacture notification requirement).
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occurs pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).166
Under NEPA, a federal agency is required to prepare an Environmental
Impact Statement (“EIS”) any time the agency undertakes a major federal
action “significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 167
With the FDA’s GRAS presumption for genetically-engineered foods
under the FDCA and the limited scope of authority of the EPA under
FIFRA and TSCA, the most significant federal action taken with respect to
genetically-engineered products is most often a decision by the USDA to
grant a developer’s petition for deregulation under the PPA. 168 During
the NEPA review, APHIS will consider a broad range of environmental
impacts, including the potential of GE crops to contaminate non-GE crops;
potential of herbicide-tolerant crops to generate herbicide-resistant weeds;
and potential effects of GE traits on wild relatives.169
While the NEPA analysis by APHIS offers an occasion for
environmental monitoring, the protection available under NEPA is
limited. For one thing, an agency need not undertake to complete an EIS
if, on the basis of a shorter Environmental Assessment (“EA”), the agency
determines that the proposed action will not have a significant impact on
the environment.170 Moreover, even if an EIS is prepared, NEPA does not
prescribe any environmental norms by which impacts should be judged
nor mandate any particular outcome concerning significant
environmental impacts. NEPA is a purely process-based statute,
requiring only that the agency conduct the analysis, consider action
alternatives, and explain its chosen outcome on the basis of the evidence
in the EIS.171 In fact, APHIS rarely conducts a full EIS before granting a
petition for nonregulated status. Until issuing an EIS ordered by federal
courts to prepare an EIS in connection with genetically-engineered alfalfa
and sugar beets, APHIS had granted more than ninety petitions for

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70(h) (2012).
§ 4332.
168
See 7 U.S.C. § 7711(c)(2) (2012); see also 7 C.F.R. § 340.6 (2016).
169
See, e.g., Rebecca L. Stankiewicz Gabel, Glyphosate-Tolerant Alfalfa Events J101 and J163:
Request for Nonregulated Status, APHIS (Dec. 2010), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/
biotechnology/downloads/alfalfa/gt_alfalfa%20_feis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A4VGUM4J].
170
See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2016); see also § 1508.13.
171
See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (stating that
if “the adverse environmental effects of the proposed action are adequately identified and
evaluated, the agency is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh
the environmental costs”).
166
167
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deregulation based on EAs.172 Of 123 products deregulated since 1995,
APHIS has performed an EIS in only six cases.173
E. Lack of Attention to Socioeconomic Impacts
Federal biotechnology regulation mostly does not address
socioeconomic impacts that are of concern to consumers. Under a few
statutes, agencies are allowed to consider socioeconomic impacts in
making decisions; for example, FIFRA requires the EPA to consider “the
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any
pesticide” in determining whether the pesticide will have “unreasonable
adverse effect on the environment,” and the NEPA analysis requires that
agencies consider the “ecological, aesthetic, cultural, economic, social, or
health” impacts of any major federal action. 174 But even those examples
of regulatory oversight of socioeconomic impacts are highly limited:
FIFRA applies only to plants with pesticidal properties, and NEPA does
not mandate any particular outcome based on the analysis of impacts. 175
This lack of attention to socioeconomic impacts is not inevitable; other
countries mandate consideration of social and economic impacts in their
regulatory systems for GE crops and foods. The European Union, for
example, requires labeling as a gesture to public concerns and has
developed general guidance for managing coexistence between producers
of genetically-engineered and conventional crops. 176 Brazil protects non172
See Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, No. C 06-01075CRB, 2007 WL 776146, at *2–3 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 12, 2007); see also Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 955 (N.D. Cal.
2010); Andrew Pollack, Judge Revokes Approval of Modified Sugar Beets, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/14/business/14sugar.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/YKC8-ZLJP].
173
See Determination of Nonregulated Status of Event 5307 Corn, supra note 59. Apart from
those ordered by the courts, the petitions for which APHIS has prepared a full EIS involved
products engineered to withstand more toxic herbicides, such as Dicamba and 2,4-D, which
offer growers alternatives to glyphosate use. Id. The EIS prepared a statement for Monsanto
Dicamba and Glufosinate-tolerant cotton and Dicamba and Glufosinate-resistant corn. Id.
For DOW, the EIS prepared glyphosate and glufosinate-tolerant soybean; 2,4-D and
glufosinate-tolerant soybean; and 2,4-D and Glufosinate-tolerant cotton deregulated based
on EA. Id.
174
7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2012); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2016).
175
See § 136(bb); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4372(d)(4) (2012).
176
See Commission Regulation 1829/03, 2003 O.J. (268) 16; Commission Regulation
1830/03, 2003 O.J. (268) 23; see also Commission Improves Rules on Labelling and Tracing of GMOs
in Europe to Enable Freedom of Choice and Ensure Environmental Safety (July 25, 2001),
https://research.cip.cgiar.org/confluence/download/attachments/3450/F2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N6U9-A5DQ]; Report from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on the Coexistence of Genetically Modified Crops with Conventional and Organic
Farming (Apr. 2, 2009), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:
2009:0153:FIN:en:PDF [https://perma.cc/N6U9-A5DQ].

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2017

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 2 [2017], Art. 6

514

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

GE growers through mandatory isolation distances, exclusion zones, and
other coexistence rules for certain crops.177 Brazilian law also protects
non-GE farmers by allocating strict liability for contamination to anyone
responsible for damage to the environment or third parties from GE. 178
Brazil also mandates the labeling of GE foods and food products. 179
Federal agencies can, in some instances, address socioeconomic
impacts of genetically engineered crops or foods through their more
general authority. For example, a committee appointed by the USDA to
consider coexistence measures recommended that more data be collected
to better understand the extent of any economic losses to farmers from
contamination.180 If action should be needed, the committee
recommended an insurance scheme modeled on federal crop insurance.181
In 2009, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) opened an investigation of the
consolidation of the seed market and the practices of the major seed
developers, but the investigation was closed without action three years
later.182 The Obama Administration’s “Feed the Future” program
includes an initiative led by the United States Agency for International
Development (“USAID”) and the USDA “to strengthen international
public goods research in ways that generate technologies and knowledge
that support agricultural productivity in both the United States and
developing countries,” and progress reports on the program highlight a
couple of genetic engineering initiatives.183
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR NEW BIOTECHNOLOGY LEGISLATION
With the necessity of new legislation comes the freedom to re-imagine
that legislation to create a better, more nuanced, and more balanced
approach to regulation. Instead of sweeping persistent consumer
177
See Resolução Normativa, CTNBio No. 4 (Aug. 16, 2007) (corn); Resolução Normativa,
CTNBio No. 10 (Oct. 2, 2013).
178
See Art. 20, Lei No. 11,105 (Mar. 24, 2005).
179
See Art. 6(III), Lei No. 8,078 (Sept. 11, 1990); see also Decreto 4680/03 (Apr. 24, 2003).
180
See USDA ENHANCING COEXISTENCE, supra note 74, at 9–15.
181
See id. at 14–15.
182
See Ian Berry & David Kesmodel, U.S. Closes Antitrust Investigation Into Seed Industry,
Monsanto, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412
7887324735104578123631878019070 [https://perma.cc/ZH42-HNCS]; Peter Whoriskey,
Monsanto’s Dominance Draws Antitrust Inquiry, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/28/AR20091128024
71.html [https://perma.cc/ZE46-AZHA].
183
See Feed the Future: Global Food Security Research Strategy 6 (May 2011),
https://www.feedthefuture.gov/sites/default/files/resource/files/FTF_research_strateg
y.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S49-UAQX]; see also id. at 40–41; 2015 Feed the Future Progress
Report 15–16 (2015), https://www.feedthefuture.gov/sites/default/files/resource/files/
Feed_the_Future_Results_Summary_Progress_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6LT-WQG9].
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objections under the rug, that legislation may be crafted to acknowledge
areas of scientific uncertainty, to support, rather than thwart, further
safety research, and to reach ancillary socioeconomic questions relating to
GMOs and their impacts on the farm, in the market, and around the world
where the federal government may provide key leadership. That new
legislation must address several important policy questions. The
questions canvassed below will be examined in detail in future work. 184
A. Framing of Risk Assessment
An updated legislative and regulatory framework should re-consider
the appropriate mechanism for determining whether a GE plant variety
or GE-derived food will be subject to regulatory oversight and at what
level. A preliminary question to that determination is whether the
regulatory mechanism should apply to all new plant varieties and animal
breeds, or merely those derived using genetic engineering, and if the
latter, what techniques should qualify as “genetic engineering” for
regulatory purposes.
B. Allocation of Regulatory Authority
As long as the statutory authorization for agency oversight must be
revised (and it must, as new technology outgrows the PPA and the
FDCA), the allocation of regulatory authority among the various agencies
can be reconsidered. APHIS, the FDA, and the EPA have acquired over a
quarter-century of experience at biotechnology regulation, but in some
ways that oversight has been a poor fit for respective agency mandates.
New legislation could consider various options: keep the allocation as it
is (field tests with APHIS, food safety and new animal breed approvals
with the FDA, and plant pesticides and microorganisms with the EPA);
reallocate authority among the current agencies (such as giving greater
environmental oversight responsibility to the EPA); consolidation of
authority in a single agency such as the FDA; or even creation of a new
agency that would handle all aspects of biotechnology oversight and
federally-funded research and monitoring.
C. Source of Statutory Authority for Agency Oversight
Can legislative authority for biotechnology regulation be
accomplished by amending the PPA, FDCA, FIFRA, or TSCA? Or should
Congress reject the determination made by the Office of Science and
See Alison Peck, Re-Imagining Federal Biotechnology Regulation, FOOD & DRUG L.J.
(forthcoming 2017).
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Technology Policy in the 1980s that biotechnology regulation could be
accomplished under statutes that predated the technology? While
continuation of authority under the existing statutes seems more
consistent with a risk-based rather than a process-based model, attempts
to place jurisdiction under statutes that regulate “plant pests” or “food
additives” seem increasingly anathema to modern genetic engineering
techniques. A third option might include a combination of amendments,
both substantial and minor, to existing statutes, along with the creation of
a new federal body with coordinating and review responsibilities through
new legislation.185
D. Addressing Socioeconomic Impacts
New legislation also offers an opportunity to address socioeconomic
impacts more comprehensively. Express mandates to monitor and control
these impacts might be placed in the agencies that oversee new products,
or in other existing agencies like DOJ or the Federal Trade Commission
where appropriate. Initiatives that should be considered and debated
include coordination of approvals of new GE plant or animal varieties or
GE-derived foods between the United States and foreign regulators;
liability insurance schemes or other liability allocation mechanisms for
farmers injured by contamination with GE varieties; publicly funded
research for new GE plant and animal varieties of particular benefit to
farmers in developing countries and beneficial terms for transfer of such
technology; and, of course, federal labeling rules.
V. CONCLUSION
The Coordinated Framework need not be maintained out of loyalty or
lethargy. That framework arose from an urgent desire to approve the first
GMO products from U.S. developers in the early days of the technology,
and was based on the type of technology used at the time. That
framework failed to address many legitimate concerns shared by many
consumers, including scientific uncertainty as to safety for human health,
increasing adverse agronomic and environmental impacts, and lack of
attention to socioeconomic effects of GMOs in the field and in the
marketplace. Moreover, market conditions and technology have evolved
since 1986 and so must federal oversight. Since regulation under the PPA,
FDCA, and FIFRA does not give agencies adequate authority to deal with
185
This hybrid approach was attempted by Congress in early efforts to pass new legislation
governing biotechnology. See Biotechnology Science Coordination Act, H.R. 4452, 99th
Cong. (1985), S. 1967, 99th Cong. (1985); Omnibus Biotechnology Act, H.R. 5232, 101st Cong.
(1990).
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many of these concerns and changes, it is critical that Congress pass new
legislation in the near term. New legislation provides an opportunity to
include the public’s voice in the conversation and to address the most
persistently-raised policy concerns in a way that recognizes adverse
impacts and scientific uncertainty and takes public concerns seriously.
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